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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TWEAKING THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT: AN ARGUMENT
AGAINST DURATIONAL-RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS FOR
ALCOHOL BEVERAGE WHOLESALERS AND RETAILERS

INTRODUCTION
Say you lived in Washington D.C. and owned a successful restaurant, the
profitability of which depended in part on its wine, beer, and liquor sales. The
restaurant was successful enough to begin looking for a second location. You
determine that Bethesda, Maryland is an ideal location because it is only seven
miles from your D.C. residence, but there is one problem: the Maryland Code of
Alcoholic Beverages imposes a two-year durational-residency requirement on
restaurant owners seeking a restaurant liquor license. 1 In order to sell alcohol at
the new restaurant, you have to establish a second residence in Bethesda, live
there for two years, and face the associated costs.
The Commerce Clause gives the U.S. Congress power to “regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States.” 2 This affirmative grant of power
1. See MD. CODE ANN., Alcoholic Beverages § 4-109(a)(4) (West 2016) (requiring an
applicant for a liquor license to have been a resident for the “2 years immediately before filing the
application”); see also Aaron Kraut, Liquor License Residency Requirement a Hurdle to Some,
BETHESDA MAG. (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.bethesdamagazine.com/Bethesda-Beat/2014/LiquorLicense-Residency-Requirement-A-Hurdle-To-Some/ [https://perma.cc/QBX9-QU53]. Maryland
is not the only State that imposes durational-residency requirements on alcohol beverage
wholesalers and/or retailers. In Tennessee, a retail liquor license may be issued only if you have
been a “bona fide resident of [the] state during the two-year period immediately preceding the date
upon which application is made.” TENN. CODE ANN. § 57-3-204(b)(2)(A) (West 2016). This statute
was ruled unconstitutional by the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee in Byrd
v. Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n, 259 F. Supp. 3d 785 (M.D. Tenn. 2017). The case has
been appealed to the Sixth Circuit, but no decision had been issued at the time this Comment was
due for publication. In Wisconsin, you must have resided continuously in the state for at least ninety
days prior to the application date to qualify for any license related to alcohol beverages. WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 125.04(5)(a)(2) (West 2016). In Missouri, a corporation must be a “resident corporation”
to obtain a wholesaler license. MO. REV. STAT. § 311.060.2(3) (2016). To be a “resident
corporation,” the corporation must be incorporated under the laws of Missouri, and all of its officers
and directors must be “bona fide residents” of Missouri for at least three years. Id. § 311.060.3. In
Indiana, a corporation cannot obtain an “alcoholic beverage retailer’s permit of any type unless
sixty percent (60%) of the outstanding common stock is owned by persons who have been
continuous and bona fide residents of Indiana for five (5) years.” IND. CODE § 7.1-3-21-5(a) (2017);
see also Greg Trotter, Binny’s Expansion to Indiana Thwarted by State Liquor Law Changes, CHI.
TRIB. (Apr. 15, 2016, 2:00 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-binnys-indiana-ex
pansion-0417-biz-20160415-story.html [https://perma.cc/V6K4-537Q?type=image].
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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implies a negative converse known as the dormant Commerce Clause, which
prohibits the States from passing legislation that improperly burdens or
discriminates against interstate commerce. 3 Normally, when a state statute
discriminates on its face, in its purpose, or in its effect against interstate
commerce, a strict scrutiny test is applied, and the State must advance “a
legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable
nondiscriminatory alternatives” in order to validate the statute. 4 At a minimum,
imposing a durational-residency requirement on alcohol beverage wholesalers
and retailers discriminates in its effect against interstate commerce because it
denies out-of-state residents access to the alcohol market on equal terms as instate residents. 5 However, Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment can save
state alcohol regulations, such as durational-residency requirements, from
Commerce Clause scrutiny. 6 Section 2 of the Amendment provides: “The
transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the
United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of
the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.” 7

3. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626–28 (1978) (holding a state law
unconstitutional because it discriminated against articles of interstate commerce); Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142, 145 (1970) (holding a state law unconstitutional because it
improperly burdened interstate commerce); see also New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S.
269, 273 (1988) (“It has long been accepted that the Commerce Clause not only grants Congress
the authority to regulate commerce among the States, but also directly limits the powers of the
States to discriminate against interstate commerce.”).
4. New Energy Co. of Ind., 486 U.S. at 278; see also Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 628. A state
statute that discriminates against interstate commerce faces a “virtually per se rule of invalidity.”
Id. at 624.
5. See Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dept. of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)
(“‘Discrimination’ simply means differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic
interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.”). A durational-residency requirement
burdens out-of-state residents. An in-state resident either already meets the durational-residency
requirement or it at least has more “in-state days” to put toward the requirement than an out-ofstate resident.
6. “Commerce Clause scrutiny” refers to both a strict scrutiny test and a Pike balancing test.
If the statute regulates evenhandedly (i.e., it does not discriminate on its face, purpose, or effect) to
advance the health, safety, or welfare of its citizens, but it still has some inadvertent or incidental
impact on interstate commerce, then a Pike balancing test is applied. See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
Under the Pike balancing test, the statute does not face a “virtually per se rule of invalidity.”
Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624. Rather, the statute is valid unless the burden on commerce is “clearly
excessive” when measured against the state interest. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2. In an effort to end Prohibition, Congress proposed the
Twenty-first Amendment to the States, and on December 5, 1933, the requisite 3/4 of States ratified
it through state ratifying conventions. Robert P. George, The Twenty-First Amendment, CONST.
CTR., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/amendments/amendment-xxi
[https://perma.cc/3K9Y-D2Z9]. The Twenty-first Amendment is the only Amendment to have been
ratified by state ratifying conventions. Id.
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Early Supreme Court cases interpreting Section 2 held that it gave the States
authorization to discriminate against alcohol. 8 This view slowly changed, and
the Supreme Court has more recently held that the Twenty-first Amendment
does not entirely remove state alcohol regulations from Commerce Clause
scrutiny.
To draw a conclusion . . . that the Twenty-first Amendment has somehow
operated to “repeal” the Commerce Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating
liquors is concerned would, however, be an absurd oversimplification. If the
Commerce Clause had been pro tanto “repealed,” then Congress would be left
with no regulatory power over interstate or foreign commerce in intoxicating
liquor. Such a conclusion would be patently bizarre and is demonstrably
incorrect. 9

Although the Twenty-first Amendment does not save all state alcohol
regulations from Commerce Clause scrutiny, it has and continues to give the
States significant power in how they design their alcohol distribution systems.
Once the Amendment passed, many States developed a three-tier system of
alcohol distribution, and now virtually every State has adopted it. 10 The three
tiers are: (1) the producer or supplier, (2) the distributor or wholesaler, and (3)
the retailer. 11 Typically, producers sell to in-state wholesalers, and the
wholesalers pay excise taxes. 12 In-state wholesalers sell to in-state retailers, such
as the local liquor store, bar, or restaurant that sells alcohol. 13 The retailers then
sell to consumers and collect state sales tax. 14 The “main purpose” of the threetiered system was to eliminate “the existence of a ‘tied’ system between
producers and retailers, a system generally believed to enable organized crime
8. See State Bd. of Equalization of Cal. v. Young’s Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59, 62 (1936) (“The
words used [in Section 2] are apt to confer upon the State the power to forbid all importations which
do not comply with the conditions which it prescribes. The plaintiffs ask us to limit this broad
command. They request us to construe the Amendment as saying, in effect: The State may prohibit
the importation of intoxicating liquors provided it prohibits the manufacture and sale within its
borders; but if it permits such manufacture and sale, it must let imported liquors compete with the
domestic on equal terms. To say that, would involve not a construction of the Amendment, but a
rewriting of it.” (emphasis added)); see also Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm’n
of Mich., 305 U.S. 391, 394 (1939) (holding that “the right of a state to prohibit or regulate the
importation of intoxicating liquor is not limited by the commerce clause”); Mahoney v. Joseph
Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401, 403–04 (1938) (upholding a statute that “clearly discriminates in favor
of liquor processed within the State as against liquor completely processed elsewhere”).
9. Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 331–32 (1964).
10. Andrew Tamayo, What’s Brewing in the Old North State: An Analysis of the Beer
Distribution Laws Regulating North Carolina’s Craft Breweries, 88 N.C. L. REV. 2198, 2204
(2010).
11. Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 571 F.3d 185, 187 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Tamayo, supra
note 10, at 2204.
12. Arnold’s Wines, 571 F.3d at 187; see also Tamayo, supra note 10, at 2200–01, 2204.
13. Tamayo, supra note 10, at 2201, 2204.
14. Arnold’s Wines, 571 F.3d at 187; see also Tamayo, supra note 10, at 2204.
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to dominate the industry.” 15 Curbing alcohol consumption was another goal of
the three-tier system. 16 However, some States use their regulatory power under
the three-tier system to impose durational-residency requirements on alcohol
beverage wholesalers and retailers. 17
This Comment will argue that the Twenty-first Amendment does not save
these durational-residency requirements from Commerce Clause scrutiny. Part I
of this Comment examines the Supreme Court’s decision in Granholm v. Heald,
which struck down state statutes that effectively required out-of-state wineries
to operate in state before they could compete on equal terms with in-state
wineries. Although the statutes did not impose durational-residency
requirements, Granholm is the leading case on the interplay between the
Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause. Part II examines a current
circuit split between the Eight Circuit and Fifth Circuit. In 2013, the Eighth
Circuit held that the Twenty-first Amendment saves durational-residency
requirements for wholesalers from Commerce Clause scrutiny. In 2016, the Fifth
Circuit held that the Amendment does not authorize durational-residency
requirements for wholesalers and retailers, and thus the requirements are subject
to Commerce Clause scrutiny. Part III argues that the Eighth Circuit’s holding
should be reversed because durational-residency requirements directly regulate
citizens, and the Twenty-first Amendment only gives States the power to directly
regulate alcohol products.
I. GRANHOLM V. HEALD
In Granholm, the Supreme Court struck down both Michigan and New York
statutes that permitted in-state wineries to ship their products directly to in-state
consumers, but prohibited out-of-state wineries from doing so. 18 To obtain this
preferential treatment and bypass the three-tier system, an out-of-state winery
needed to set-up an in-state operation. The statutes did not impose durationalresidency requirements. 19 Rather, they effectively imposed “physical presence”

15. Arnold’s Wines, 571 F.3d at 187.
16. Professor Marcia Yablon argues that the Twenty-first Amendment was “created to
effectuate . . . temperance goals.” Marcia Yablon, The Prohibition Hangover: Why We Are Still
Feeling the Effects of Prohibition, VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & LAW 552, 554 (2006). To effectuate those
goals, the three-tier system sought to curb consumption by subjecting alcoholic beverages to two
layers of tax, see, e.g., id., which inevitably leads to higher prices.
17. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. When this Comment refers to wholesalers and
retailers, it is specifically referring to alcohol beverage wholesalers and retailers.
18. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 465–66 (2005).
19. Although Granholm did not deal with durational-residency requirements, it is the leading
case on the interplay between the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause. The Eighth
Circuit relied heavily on the principles and reasoning established in Granholm when it held that the
Twenty-first Amendment authorized durational-residency requirement for wholesalers.
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requirements. 20 Ultimately, the Court, in a 6–3 decision, held that the statutes
were not authorized by the Twenty-first Amendment and violated the Commerce
Clause. 21
A.

Michigan and New York Statutes

In Michigan, most alcoholic beverages must pass through a three-tier
system. 22 Under this system, both in-state and out-of-state producers may sell
only to licensed in-state wholesalers. 23 The wholesalers may sell only to in-state
retailers, and then in-state retailers sell the alcohol to consumers. 24 Thus,
producers cannot bypass the three-tier system and sell directly to consumers.
However, the Michigan statute created an exception for in-state wineries, which
allowed them to bypass the system and sell directly to in-state consumers. 25 Outof-state wineries did not receive this preferential treatment. Rather, they had to
first distribute their products through the state’s three-tier system and face the
inherent disadvantages. 26
In New York, alcohol is also distributed through a three-tier system. 27
However, wineries that produce wine only from New York grapes (i.e., in-state
wineries) 28 qualify for a license allowing them to bypass the three-tier system
and ship directly to in-state consumers. 29 A winery that does not produce wine
from New York grapes (i.e., an out-of-state winery) can bypass the three-tier
system only if it becomes a “licensed New York winery.” 30 This requires the
establishment of “a branch factory, office or storeroom within the state of New
York.” 31 Both the New York and Michigan statutes effectively required out-of20. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 474.
21. Id. at 466. In other words, the statutes did not survive Commerce Clause scrutiny.
22. Id. at 468–69.
23. Id. at 469.
24. Id.
25. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 469. The statute made only in-state wineries eligible for a license
to ship directly to in-state consumers. Id.
26. See id. at 466. The Court recognized that the statutes at issue put out-of-state wineries at a
disadvantage from an “economic standpoint.” Id. For example, assume there is one in-state
producer and one out-of-state producer, and each makes the exact same product. If the product has
to pass through an in-state wholesaler and an in-state retailer before reaching the consumer, then
the price of the product is naturally going to rise. But if the in-state producer can skip these steps,
then it can sell its product cheaper and gain a “competitive advantage” over the out-of-state
producer. See id.
27. Id. at 470.
28. The effect of the statute was to benefit in-state wineries because a winery residing in New
York will most likely use grapes grown in New York. “[T]he result is to allow local wineries to
make direct sales to consumers in New York on terms not available to out-of-state wineries.” Id.
29. Id.
30. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 470.
31. Id. (quoting N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW ANN. § 3(37) (West. Supp. 2005)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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state wineries to have a “physical presence” in the state before their wine
received the same treatment as in-state wine. 32
B.

Strict Scrutiny Test Triggered

The Court had “no difficulty” in determining that these statutes
discriminated against interstate commerce because they gave preferential
treatment to in-state producers. 33 As a result, the statutes “deprive[d] citizens of
their right to have access to the markets of other States on equal terms.” 34
If a state statute discriminates on its face, in its purpose, or in its effect
against an out-of-state interest or interstate commerce, then the statute faces a
“virtually per se rule of invalidity” and a strict scrutiny test is applied. 35 In order
to validate the statute, the State must show that the discriminatory regulation
“advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by
reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.” 36 These statutes are routinely struck
down unless “the discrimination [they impose] is demonstrably justified by a
valid factor unrelated to economic protectionism.” 37 Here, if the challenged
statutes were not alcohol regulations, the Court would immediately apply a strict
scrutiny test.
C. Does the Twenty-First Amendment Save the Statutes from Commerce
Clause Scrutiny?
The Court recognized that the statutes faced “a virtually per se rule of
invalidity.” 38 But before applying a strict scrutiny test, the Court considered
whether Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment saved the statutes. 39 The
Court noted that this section
“grants the States virtually complete control over whether to permit importation
or sale of liquor and how to structure the liquor distribution system.” A State
which chooses to ban the sale and consumption of alcohol altogether could bar
its importation; and, as our history shows, it would have to do so to make its
laws effective. States may also . . . funnel [alcohol] sales through the three-tier

32. Id. at 474. “Out-of-state wineries . . . face[d] a complete ban on direct shipment.” Id.
33. Id. at 476.
34. Id. at 473.
35. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978); see also Granholm, 544
U.S. at 476.
36. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t. of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 100–01 (1994)
(quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
37. New Energy Co. of Ind., 486 U.S. at 274.
38. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 476 (quoting Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
39. Id.
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system. We have previously recognized that the three-tier system itself is
“unquestionably legitimate.” 40

Thus, Section 2 is in tension with the Commerce Clause because it gives the
States significant power in a particular field of interstate commerce. Resolving
this tension, the Court held that even though Section 2 gives States power to
regulate alcohol, it “does not displace the rule that States may not give a
discriminatory preference to their own producers.” 41 The nondiscrimination
principle of the Commerce Clause still applies to state alcohol regulations.42
Here, the statutes were a “straightforward” attempt to discriminate against outof-state producers, and thus the Twenty-first Amendment did not save them from
Commerce Clause scrutiny. 43
D. Returning to a Strict Scrutiny Test
The Court returned to a strict scrutiny test to determine whether the statutes
“advance[] a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by
reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.” 44 First, the States proposed that the
statutes served legitimate state interests by keeping alcohol out of the hands of
minors because minors have easy access to credit cards and the Internet. 45 But
the States offered no “concrete evidence” that out-of-state wineries shipping to
in-state consumers will increase alcohol consumption by minors. 46 And the
Court requires the “clearest showing” to justify a discriminatory state statute. 47
Second, New York argued that its statute facilitated tax collection to protect
against potential lost tax revenue. 48 Although the Court recognized that New

40. Id. at 488–89 (first quoting Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,
445 U.S. 97, 110 (1980); and then quoting North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)
(Scalia, J., concurring)).
41. Id. at 486.
42. Id. at 487.
43. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489.
44. Id. at 489 (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
45. Id. at 489–90. The States argued that minors “are likely to take advantage of direct wine
shipments as a means of obtaining alcohol illegally.” Id. at 489.
46. Id. at 490.
47. Id. (quoting C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 393 (1994))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
48. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 491. Michigan advanced a similar argument, but the Court quickly
recognized it as a “diversion.” Id. Most States rely on wholesalers to collect taxes. Id. The
wholesalers pay excise tax, and the retailers pay sales tax. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions
Regarding Alcoholic Beverages Excise Tax, N.C. DEP’T REV., https://files.nc.gov/ncdor/docu
ments/faq/alcoholfaqs.pdf?YE1DwnS2aR5v7t4ffOo.oom37XBuIOEh [https://perma.cc/U3V7-TZ
74]. Michigan does not rely on wholesalers to collect taxes. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 491. Instead it
“collects taxes directly from out-of-state wineries on all wine shipped to in-state wholesalers.” Id.
It requires out-of-state wineries to submit to the state a tax report of all wine sold. Id. The Court
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York’s tax collection concern was not “wholly illusory,” this objective could be
achieved without discriminating against interstate commerce. 49 The Court found
that something as simple as requiring producers to submit regular sales reports
and pay state taxes based on the reports could achieve New York’s end goal. 50
Other rationales New York and Michigan offered were: “facilitating orderly
market conditions, protecting public health and safety, and ensuring regulatory
accountability.” 51 Yet, the Court found that these objectives could be achieved
with a nondiscriminatory alternative (i.e., an “evenhanded licensing
requirement”). 52 Thus, although States have broad power to regulate alcohol
under Section 2, they must do so on evenhanded terms unless they can
demonstrate the need for discrimination. 53
E.

Granholm Test

The test, set forth in Granholm, for determining the constitutionality of state
alcohol regulations can be summarized as follows: the Twenty-first Amendment
saves state alcohol regulations “when they treat [alcohol] produced out of state
the same as its domestic equivalent.” 54 A regulation requiring out-of-state
wineries to have an in-state presence if their wine is to receive the same
treatment as wine from an in-state winery fails this test, and it must survive
Commerce Clause scrutiny to be deemed constitutional. Although the Court
made clear that “straightforward attempts” to discriminate, like the New York
and Michigan statutes, are not saved, 55 it provided no examples of nonstraightforward attempts. 56
found “[i]f licensing and self-reporting provide adequate safeguards for wine distributed through
the three-tier system, there is no reason to believe they will not suffice for direct shipments.” Id.
49. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 491.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 492.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 493.
54. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489.
55. Id.
56. What would qualify as a non-straightforward attempt, and therefore would be saved by the
Twenty-first Amendment? The New York and Michigan statutes discriminated, at a minimum, in
their effect, against interstate commerce because they denied out-of-state residents access to the
alcohol market on equal terms as in-state residents. The statutes also likely discriminated in their
purpose—the Court referred to them as “straightforward attempts” to discriminate. Id. Either way,
the discrimination triggers a strict scrutiny test, and ultimately the Court applied a strict scrutiny
test. Id. If the Twenty-first Amendment cannot save a state alcohol regulation that triggers strict
scrutiny, from an application of the strict scrutiny test, what regulations can it save? One clear
answer is the three-tier system. As Granholm shows, States can require all alcohol products to pass
through a three-tier distribution system. Id. A statute enforcing the three-tier system without any
exceptions regulates evenhandedly between in-state and out-of-state producers, but it still arguably
has some inadvertent or incidental impact on interstate commerce. See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. For
example, in a three-tier system the producer sells to the wholesalers. Marc Sorini, Understanding
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II. CIRCUIT SPLIT: EIGHTH CIRCUIT VS. FIFTH CIRCUIT
A.

The Applicability of the Granholm Test Outside the Producer Tier

The Granholm test focused on the physical product—alcohol; yet, the
statutes at issue regulated the producers. 57 When considering a regulation of the
producer tier, a test that focuses on the treatment of the product makes sense
because the producer tier produces the alcohol products. Producers and products
are so intertwined that a statute regulating one has a direct impact on the other. 58
The test created by Granholm is specifically tied to the producer tier, and it is
important to recognize that the Granholm test is limited to discrimination
benefitting alcohol on the basis of its in-state production status.
Granholm’s test and its focus on the physical product should not extend to
the wholesaler and retailer tiers because these tiers are inherently different from
the producer tier. 59 A State cannot require all alcohol sold in the state to be
produced in the state. 60 For example, Anheuser-Busch has production operations
in eleven states, but consumers can buy its products in all fifty states. 61 Thus,
Granholm recognized that producers do not have to be in state, but their products
may have to pass through the in-state alcohol distribution system before reaching
the Three-Tier System: Its Impact on U.S. Craft Beer and You, CRAFTBEER.COM (Mar. 6, 2017),
https://www.craftbeer.com/craft-beer-muses/three-tier-system-impacts-craft-beer [https://perma.
cc/X7YQ-TMQQ]. And a State can require all alcohol to go through licensed in-state wholesalers.
See North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1982) (Scalia, J., concurring). The
requirement that all alcohol pass through an in-state wholesaler is likely to have an incidental
impact on out-of-state producers: an out-of-state producer may face greater transportation costs to
get its product to the wholesaler; an in-state producer may have a better business relationship with
the in-state wholesaler; or an out-of-state producer may not be able to find an in-state wholesaler
to do business with. If an out-of-state producer brought an action against the State, the Twenty-first
Amendment would save the requirement from application of the Pike balancing test.
57. The New York statute required out-of-state wineries to create a physical establishment in
New York in order for their wine to receive the same treatment as wine from in-state wineries. See
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 470. In Michigan, the winery had to be “in-state” before its products could
be shipped directly to consumers. See id. at 469.
58. For example in Granholm, an out-of-state producer had to set-up an in-state operation
before its products received equal treatment. Id. at 466.
59. For example, imagine there is a state regulation requiring all alcohol sold in the state to be
produced in the state (I say “imagine” because this regulation would surely not be saved by the
Twenty-first Amendment). This would be a regulation of products, and it would directly affect
producers by requiring them to be in state. However, this statute would not have the same impact
on wholesalers and retailers because they do not produce the product. Wholesalers and retailers
could still do business in the state, but the pool of producers they could buy alcohol from would be
greatly reduced.
60. See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 472 (“The mere fact of nonresidence should not foreclose a
producer in one State from access to markets in other States.”).
61. See Anheuser-Busch InBev: Other Locations, BREWERYDB, http://www.brewerydb.com/
brewery/BznahA/locations [https://perma.cc/6JW5-2XMG] (showing that Anheuser-Busch has
twelve production operations throughout eleven states).
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consumers. So if a State cannot require producers to be in state, but it can subject
the producer’s products to its distribution laws, then a test focusing on the
treatment of the products makes sense. The Granholm analysis, and its
application of the nondiscrimination principle, is still relevant when examining
a regulation of the wholesaler or producer tier, but it is important to realize why
the Court’s test focused on the product and not the physical entity producing the
product.
Despite the special nature of the producer tier, the Eighth Circuit borrowed
from the test set forth in Granholm and concluded that a State may condition
access to the wholesaler tier of its three-tier system on durational-residency. In
2016, the Fifth Circuit expressly declined to follow the Eighth Circuit and held
that the Twenty-first Amendment does not authorize durational-residency
requirements for wholesalers and retailers.
B.

Eighth Circuit: The Twenty-First Amendment Saves Durational-Residency
Requirements from Commerce Clause Scrutiny

In Southern Wine & Spirits of America, Inc. v. Division of Alcohol and
Tobacco Control, the Eighth Circuit upheld a Missouri statute that imposed a
durational-residency requirement on alcohol wholesalers. 62 The statute in
question provides: “No wholesaler license shall be issued to a corporation for
the sale of intoxicating liquor containing alcohol in excess of five percent by
weight, except to a resident corporation as defined in this section.” 63 In order to
qualify as a resident corporation, the corporation must be incorporated under
Missouri law, and all of its officers and directors must have been “bona fide
residents” of Missouri for at least three years. 64
The Division of Alcohol and Tobacco Control of the Missouri Department
of Public Safety (the “Division”) denied Southern Wine & Spirits of Missouri,
Inc. (“Southern Missouri”) a wholesaler liquor license because the company was
not a “resident corporation” under Missouri law. 65 Southern Missouri’s parent
company and sole shareholder, Southern Wine & Spirits of America, Inc.

62. 731 F.3d 799, 812–13 (8th Cir. 2013).
Missouri funnels liquor sales through a tier system, separating the distribution market
into discrete levels: the first tier consists of producers, such as brewers, distillers, and
winemakers; the second tier is comprised of solicitors, who acquire alcohol from producers
and sell it “to, by or through” wholesalers; the third tier is made up of wholesalers, who
purchase alcohol from producers or solicitors and sell it to retailers; and the fourth tier
consists of retailers, who sell alcohol to consumers.
Id. at 802 (citing MO. REV. STAT. §§ 311.180(1), 311.200 (2013)).
63. MO. REV. STAT. § 311.060.2(3) (emphasis added); see also S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 802.
64. S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 802; see also MO. REV. STAT. § 311.060.3.
65. S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 803; see also MO. REV. STAT. § 311.060.2(3).
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(“SWSA”), 66 operates its wholesale alcohol business in thirty-two other states
and the District of Columbia. 67 Even though Southern Missouri is incorporated
in Missouri, it was not free to do business in Missouri simply because its officers
and directors were Florida residents. 68
1.

Did the Statute Have a Discriminatory Purpose?

SWSA pointed to a news report quoting one of the legislation’s sponsors
back in 1947, which said the law “was intended to prevent a few big national
distillers from monopolizing the wholesale liquor business in Missouri.” 69 Thus,
SWSA argued that the purpose of the statute was “mere economic
protectionism,” 70 and relied on Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias to argue that
alcohol regulations motivated by protectionist intent are unconstitutional. 71
However, the Eighth Circuit rejected the “mere economic protectionism”
argument for several reasons. 72
In dismissing this argument, the Eighth Circuit relied heavily on a “purpose
clause” that was added to the statute in 2007, sixty years after the residency
requirement was adopted. 73 It provides that the purpose of this chapter is “to
promote responsible consumption, combat illegal underage drinking, and
achieve other important state policy goals such as maintaining an orderly
marketplace composed of state-licensed alcohol producers, importers,
distributors, and retailers.” 74 The Eighth Circuit treated this “purpose clause” as
controlling because SWSA offered no support for the proposition that a later
legislature “cannot supplant an earlier legislature’s intended purpose by enacting
an express statutory purpose provision.” 75

66. SWSA, Southern Missouri, and four Florida residents who are officers or directors of
SWSA and Southern Missouri and shareholders of SWSA (collectively “SWSA”) brought this
action. S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 803.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 807 (internal quotation marks omitted).
70. Id. (quoting Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
71. S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 809. In Bacchus, the Supreme Court ruled that a protectionist tax
exemption was unconstitutional because it violated a central tenet of the Commerce Clause, and
“mere economic protectionism” is not a clear concern of the Twenty-first Amendment. Bacchus,
468 U.S. at 276. SWSA attempted to “sail under the Bacchus flag” and win the day solely under a
“mere economic protectionism” argument. S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 807, 809.
72. First, SWSA did not raise this argument at the trial level. S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 807. Second,
newspaper articles are “rank hearsay.” Id. at 807–08. Third, this statement represents only a single
legislator’s views about the purpose of the residency requirement. Id. at 808. Fourth, the statement
does not establish the sort of protectionist intent that was conceded by the State in Bacchus. Id.
73. Id. at 808.
74. MO. REV. STAT. § 311.015 (2013); see also S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 808.
75. S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 809.
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Eighth Circuit’s Test Helps Twenty-First Amendment Save the
Statute from Commerce Clause Scrutiny

After concluding that the statute was not motivated by “mere economic
protectionism,” the Eighth Circuit’s analysis shifted to whether the Twenty-first
Amendment gives States the power to require a wholesaler to be an in-state
resident without running afoul of the Commerce Clause. 76 The Eighth Circuit
combined two Granholm principles and created a test to analyze the residency
requirement’s constitutionality: “[S]tate policies that define the structure of the
liquor distribution system while giving equal treatment to in-state and out-ofstate liquor products and producers” are protected from “constitutional
challenges based on the Commerce Clause.” 77 If a state alcohol regulation meets
this test, then, according to the Eighth Circuit, the Twenty-first Amendment
saves it.
The first part of this test, “state policies that define the structure of the liquor
distribution system,” 78 comes from Granholm’s recognition that the three-tier
system is “unquestionably legitimate.” 79 Right after this recognition, Granholm
quoted Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion from North Dakota v. United States:
“The Twenty-first Amendment . . . empowers North Dakota to require that all
liquor sold for use in the State be purchased from a licensed in-state
wholesaler.” 80 Thus, state policies that require wholesalers to be in-state do not
“run[] afoul of the Commerce Clause.” 81 And, according to the Eighth Circuit,
if States can require wholesalers to be in-state, then they can also define the
degree of “in-state” presence. 82
The second part of the test, “while giving equal treatment to in-state and
out-of-state liquor product and producers,” 83 comes from Granholm’s test:
“State policies are protected under the Twenty-first Amendment when they treat
liquor produced out of state the same as its domestic equivalent.” 84 Here, the
Eighth Circuit held that the Missouri statute “does not discriminate against out-

76. Id. at 810.
77. Id. at 809 (emphasis added).
78. Id. (emphasis added).
79. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 489 (2005) (quoting North Dakota v. United States, 495
U.S. 423, 432 (1982) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
80. North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 432; see also Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489.
81. S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 810.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 809 (emphasis added).
84. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489. The Eighth Circuit also borrowed the holding from the Second
Circuit in Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle. “Because New York’s three-tier system treats in-state and
out-of-state liquor the same, and does not discriminate against out-of-state products or producers,
we need not analyze the regulation further under Commerce Clause principles.” Arnold’s Wines,
Inc. v. Boyle, 571 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2009).
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of-state liquor products or producers.” 85 Ironically, the statute does not regulate
products or producers—it regulates wholesalers. Thus, because Missouri’s
durational-residency requirement meets the Eighth Circuit’s two-part test, the
Twenty-first Amendment protects it from Commerce Clause scrutiny.
SWSA attacked the first part of this test and contended that the durationalresidency requirement is not “protected” because it is not an “inherent” or
“integral” part of the alcohol distribution system. 86 But according to the Eighth
Circuit, “[t]here is no archetypal three-tier system from which the ‘integral’ or
‘inherent’ elements of that system may be gleaned.” 87 Even if there was, the
Supreme Court in Granholm cited “in-state wholesaler” in the first sentence after
it declared the three-tier system “unquestionably legitimate.” 88 Thus, according
to the Eighth Circuit, it follows that in-state wholesalers must be an “inherent”
or “integral” part of the three-tier system. 89 The Eighth Circuit seems to argue
that there are no “inherent” or “integral” parts to the three-tier system, and any
regulation defining the structure of the three-tier system is eligible to be saved
from Commerce Clause scrutiny.
3.

Rational Basis Test

For cautionary purposes, the Eighth Circuit proceeded as if the residency
requirement did not have a protected status. 90 Rather than applying a strict
scrutiny or balancing test, it applied a rational basis test and held that the law
“passes muster.” 91
The legislature legitimately could believe that a wholesaler governed . . . by
Missouri residents is more apt to be socially responsible and to promote
temperance, because the officers, directors, and owners are residents of the

85. S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 810. But the Eighth Circuit does not explain how this statute does not
discriminate against out-of-state liquor products. It likely reached this conclusion because the
statute regulates people and not products.
86. Id. Granholm insulated from Commerce Clause scrutiny only discrimination that is
“inherent in the three-tier system itself.” Wine Country Gift Baskets.com v. Steen, 612 F.3d 809,
818 (5th Cir. 2010).
87. S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 810.
88. Id.; see also Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489 (quoting North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S.
423, 432 (1982) (Scalia, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
89. S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 810.
90. Id. at 810–11.
91. Id. at 811. The court said the policy is subject to “deferential scrutiny.” Id. Deferential
scrutiny typically refers to rational basis review. See Jennie S. Stinebaugh, Comment,
Constitutional Law—Heller v. Doe: The Rational Basis Review Guessing Game, 25 U. MEM. L.
REV. 329, 331 (1994) (“The rational basis standard is quite deferential, and statutes scrutinized
under it are presumed to be constitutional and are almost always upheld.”); see also Raphael
Holoszyc-Pimentel, Note, Reconciling Rational-Basis Review: When Does Rational Basis Bite?,
90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2070, 2074 (2015) (“Traditionally, rational-basis review is extremely deferential
to legislatures’ enactments.”).
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community and thus subject to negative externalities—drunk driving, domestic
abuse, underage drinking—that liquor distribution may produce. . . . The
legislature logically could conclude that in-state residency facilitates law
enforcement against wholesalers, because it is easier to pursue in-state owners,
directors, and officers than to enforce against their out-of-state counterparts. 92

Yet, there was doubt as to whether the residency requirement was even rationally
related to these interests. The deputy state supervisor for the Division, who
testified on behalf of the Division, could not “‘think of any’ relationship between
the residency requirement and the safety of Missouri citizens.” 93 Additionally,
Missouri already had one nonresident wholesaler who was grandfathered in. 94
C. Fifth Circuit: The Twenty-First Amendment Does Not Authorize
Durational-Residency Requirements for Wholesalers and Retailers
In Cooper v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission, the Fifth Circuit
expressly declined to follow Southern Wine and held that the Twenty-first
Amendment does not authorize durational-residency requirements for
wholesalers and retailers. 95 There, plaintiffs could not purchase a nightclub in
Texas without endangering the club’s alcohol permit because they were out-ofstate residents. 96 The Texas Alcoholic Beverage Code (the “Code”) gives the
Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission (the “Commission”) power to refuse an
alcohol permit “to any applicant who has not been a citizen of Texas for at least
one year before filing the application.” 97 The Texas Package Stores Association
(“TPSA”) intervened as defendants. 98
TPSA relied on Southern Wine and argued that the durational-residency
requirement was constitutional because “[a]ll that the Commerce Clause
requires . . . is that a [S]tate treat liquor produced out-of-state the same as liquor
produced in-state.” 99 TPSA, like the Eighth Circuit in Southern Wine, drew this
conclusion from the test set forth in Granholm: “State policies are protected
under the Twenty-first Amendment when they treat liquor produced out of state
92. S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 811.
93. Id. Further, the supervisor noted, “wholesalers have ‘little impact upon’ the ‘direct sale’
of alcohol to minors.” Id.
94. Id. at 811–12. The existence of a nonresident wholesaler operating in Missouri would seem
to undercut Missouri’s rationale for imposing the durational-residency requirement. Yet, the Eight
Circuit determined that “[e]xceptions like grandfather clauses do not, in and of themselves,
demonstrate the invalidity of rules from which they are carved.” Id. at 812.
95. 820 F.3d 730, 743 (5th Cir. 2016).
96. Id. at 734.
97. Id. (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 735. TPSA moved for relief from a permanent injunction entered more than twenty
years ago that prevented the Commission from enforcing the Code’s residency requirement. Id. at
730. The question before this court was whether it should continue the injunction in light of
Granholm. Id. at 740.
99. Id. at 743.
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the same as its domestic equivalent.” 100 This conclusion works perfectly for
TPSA. Here, it was the owners of a nightclub seeking a license. 101 The statute
does not regulate alcohol as an article of commerce. As a result, it automatically
treats out-of-state and in-state alcohol the same because it all has to pass through
Texas’ alcohol distribution system before reaching the consumer.
The Fifth Circuit did not find TPSA’s interpretation persuasive and
expressly declined to follow Southern Wine. 102 It added an important modifier
to the TPSA’s assertion that “[a]ll . . . the Commerce Clause requires . . . is that
a [S]tate treat liquor produced out-of-state the same as liquor produced instate.” 103 The Fifth Circuit held that all the Commerce Clause requires for a state
regulation of the producer tier is that a State treat alcohol produced out-of-state
the same as alcohol produced in-state. 104 Unlike the producer tier, “state
regulations of the retailer and wholesaler tiers are not immune from Commerce
Clause scrutiny just because they do not discriminate against out-of-state
liquor.” 105 The court found that the Twenty-first Amendment does not allow
States to impose a durational-residency requirement on the owners of alcohol
retailers and wholesalers because a durational-residency requirement is not an
“inherent” aspect of the three-tier system. 106
D. Defining the States’ Power Under the Three-Tier System
The Eighth Circuit provided no limitations on a State’s power to distinguish
between in-state and out-of-state citizens under the three-tier system. 107 Not only
can Missouri require wholesalers to be in state, it can define the degree of “instate” presence. 108 However, the Fifth Circuit did provide a limitation: the
distinction has to be an “inherent aspect” of the three-tier system in order for the
Twenty-first Amendment to authorize it. 109 In Cooper, it held that durationalresidency requirements are not an “inherent aspect.” 110 But in Wine Country Gift

100. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 488–89 (2005); Cooper, 820 F.3d at 743.
101. See Cooper, 820 F.3d at 734, 743.
102. Id. at 743.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Cooper, 820 F.3d at 743 (“Distinctions between in-state and out-of-state retailers and
wholesalers are permissible only if they are an inherent aspect of the three-tier system.”).
107. The Eighth Circuit believed there were no “inherent” or “integral” aspects of the three-tier
system. See S. Wine & Spirits of Am., Inc. v. Div. of Alcohol & Tobacco Control, 731 F.3d 799,
810 (8th Cir. 2013). Also, the Second Circuit provides no limitations. Any challenge to the threetier system is a “frontal attack on the constitutionality of the three-tier system itself.” Arnold’s
Wines, Inc. v. Boyle, 571 F.3d 185, 190 (2d Cir. 2009).
108. S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 810.
109. Cooper, 820 F.3d at 743.
110. Id.
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Baskets.com v. Steen, the Fifth Circuit held that physical-presence requirements
for wholesalers and retailers are an “inherent aspect.” 111
1.

Fifth Circuit: The Twenty-First Amendment Authorizes PhysicalPresence Requirements for Retailers

The purpose of this Comment is to analyze whether the Twenty-first
Amendment saves durational-residency requirements from Commerce Clause
scrutiny. However, the reasons why the Fifth Circuit upheld a physical-presence
requirement help draw some boundaries around the States’ power under the
three-tier system.
In Wine Country, the Fifth Circuit was presented with a challenge to a state
statute, which “allow[s] in-state retailers to deliver alcoholic beverages to their
customers within designated local areas, but forbid[s] out-of-state retailers from
delivering or shipping alcoholic beverages to customers anywhere in Texas.” 112
Thus, an out-of-state retailer needs an in-state operation to make local deliveries.
The reason the Fifth Circuit upheld the statute was because the “physical
location of businesses” is an inherent aspect of the three-tier system. 113 The
“legal residence of owners,” however, is not an inherent aspect. 114 This
distinction is important because it allows the owner of an alcohol retail chain to
operate in several states.
The court noted that this statue did not discriminate against out-of-state
retailers. 115 Assuming that the statute still had an inadvertent or incidental
impact on interstate commerce, the court should have applied a Pike balancing
test. Thus, the Twenty-first Amendment saved this statute from a Pike balancing
test.
III. WHY THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT SHOULD NOT SAVE DURATIONALRESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS FROM COMMERCE CLAUSE SCRUTINY
A.

Preventing the Practical Effect of the Eighth Circuit’s Holding

In Granholm, the Supreme Court expressed concern over States enacting
laws that burden out-of-state citizens. 116 It recognized that “States should not be

111. 612 F.3d 809, 821 (5th Cir. 2010).
112. Id. at 812.
113. Id. at 821.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 820. “Granholm prohibited discrimination against out-of-state products or
producers. Texas has not tripped over that bar by allowing in-state retailer deliveries. Yet it also
has not discriminated among retailers.” Id. The remedy sought was allowing in-state retailers to
ship anywhere in Texas because local retailers can deliver within their counties. Id. This would
give out-of-state retailers “dramatically greater rights than Texas ones.” Id.
116. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 472 (2005). (“States may not enact laws that burden
out-of-state producers or shippers simply to give a competitive advantage to in-state businesses.”).
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compelled to negotiate with each other regarding favored or disfavored status
for their own citizens.” 117 That is why we have a rule prohibiting improper state
discrimination against interstate commerce—it is “essential to the foundations
of the Union.” 118 It was a central concern of the Framers because “economic
Balkanization . . . had plagued relations among the Colonies and later among the
States under the Articles of Confederation.” 119 The nondiscrimination principle
of the Commerce Clause prevents rivalries among the States and the
“proliferation of trade zones.” 120 Other Supreme Court cases examining state
alcohol regulations have expressed this concern:
[T]he practical effect of the statute must be evaluated not only by considering
the consequences of the statute itself, but also by considering how the challenged
statute may interact with the legitimate regulatory regimes of other States and
what effect would arise if not one, but many or every, State adopted similar
legislation. 121

The practical effect of allowing Missouri to require all officers and directors
of a wholesale company to be Missouri residents for at least three years is that it
allows other States to pass similar laws. Hypothetically, if every State passed
similar laws, alcohol wholesalers could never gain a license to operate in more
than one state.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court missed an opportunity to prevent this
result from happening in the future. After the Fifth Circuit held that the Twentyfirst Amendment does not authorize durational-residency requirements, TPSA
filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court. 122 On November
28, 2016, the Supreme Court denied the petition. 123
Future courts should follow the Fifth Circuit and hold that the Twenty-first
Amendment does not authorize durational-residency requirements for
wholesalers and retailers. As the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
recognized, the Twenty-first Amendment should not save laws that directly
regulate the owners of alcohol retailer and wholesaler companies 124 simply
because the laws treat in-state and out-of-state alcohol the same. Durational-

117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325–26 (1979)).
120. Id.
121. Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989).
122. Texas Package Stores Assoc., Inc. v. Fine Wine and Spirits of North Texas, LLC,
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/texas-package-stores-assoc-inc-vSCOTUSBLOG,
fine-wine-and-spirits-of-north-texas-llc/ [https://perma.cc/T8BQ-MCT8].
123. Tex. Package Stores Ass’n, Inc. v. Fine Wine & Spirits of N. Tex., LLC, 820 F.3d 730
(5th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 85 U.S.L.W. 3255 (U.S. Nov. 28, 2016) (No. 16-242); see also
SCOTUSBLOG, supra note 122.
124. For the remainder of this Comment, when “citizens” is used it refers to the owners of
alcohol retailer and wholesaler companies.
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residency requirements should not be able to evade Commerce Clause scrutiny
so easily. The Fifth Circuit’s ruling was correct because it distinguished between
products and citizens. 125
The Missouri statute in Southern Wine should be, at a minimum, subjected
to strict scrutiny because the Twenty-first Amendment intended to provide a
shield only for state laws regulating alcohol products, not citizens. And, even if
it did intend to cover citizens, the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning for why the
nondiscrimination principle does not apply takes the Granholm reasoning one
step too far.
1.

The Twenty-First Amendment Only Gives States the Power to
Regulate Products, Not Citizens

The Twenty-first Amendment only gives States the power to regulate the
“transportation or importation” of “intoxicating liquors” 126 because the
Amendment only intended to give “dry” States the power to be dry. The
Commerce Clause prevented States from subjecting out-of-state alcohol to the
same laws as in-state alcohol. So a “dry” State could not truly be “dry” because
alcohol crossing state lines had interstate immunity. As a result, Congress
proposed to remove the interstate “immunity” from alcohol products, not
citizens involved in the alcohol market.
a.

Legislative Intent

Before Prohibition, the States’ “police powers” allowed them to ban the
production of domestic alcohol. 127 But a State that wished to be “dry” had no
power to prevent liquor from entering its borders because the dormant
Commerce Clause prevented the States from improperly burdening interstate
commerce. 128 So in 1890, Congress passed the Wilson Act, which empowered
States to regulate imported liquor “to the same extent and in the same manner as
though such liquids or liquors had been produced in such State or Territory.” 129
It did not allow States to discriminate against out-of-state liquor. 130 However,
125. “The Twenty-first Amendment does not, however, authorize states to impose a durationalresidency requirement on the owners of alcoholic beverage retailers and wholesalers.” Cooper v.
Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 820 F.3d 730, 743 (5th Cir. 2016).
126. U.S. Const. amend. XXI, § 2.
127. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 671 (1887) (“The state [has the] authority to prohibit
the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors . . . .”).
128. Ethan P. Davis, Liquor Laws and Constitutional Conventions: A Legal History of the
Twenty-first Amendment 7 (Apr. 1, 2008) (unpublished Yale Law School paper) (available at
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1065&context=student_papers
[https://perma.cc/SUA7-PAD8]) (“Because of the dormant Commerce Clause . . . dry states were
powerless to erect legal barriers to the importation of alcohol from out-of-state.”).
129. Wilson Act, 26 Stat. 313, 27 U.S.C. § 121 (1890); see also Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S.
460, 478 (2005).
130. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 478.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2017]

TWEAKING THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT

279

the Supreme Court gave the Wilson Act a restricted construction and held that
the Act authorized States to regulate only the resale of imported liquor.131 Thus,
States had no power to regulate alcohol that entered its border in its “original
package.” 132 This loophole prevented States from imposing their laws on alcohol
products involved in interstate commerce.
In order to close this loophole, Congress passed the Webb-Kenyon Act in
1913. The Act prohibited “[t]he shipment or transportation” of alcohol into a
state that is intended “to be received, possessed, sold, or in any manner used,
either in the original package or otherwise, in violation of any law of such State
. . . .” 133 One of the law’s principal sponsors, Senator William S. Kenyon, said
that the bill’s “only purpose” was “to remove the impediment existing as to the
States in the exercise of their police powers regarding the traffic or control of
intoxicating liquors within their borders.” 134 Like the Wilson Act, it did not
allow discrimination against articles of interstate commerce. 135 Rather, it simply
removed “all immunities of liquor in interstate commerce.” 136 Thus, a “dry”
State could prevent alcohol from entering its borders as long as it banned the
manufacture and sale of alcohol within its borders.
At the time Congress was discussing proposals to repeal the Eighteenth
Amendment, States that wished to be “dry” worried that the Webb-Kenyon Act

131. See Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412, 423 (1898) (“[T]he provisions of the act were intended
by congress to cause the legislative authority of the respective states to attach to intoxicating liquors
coming into the states by an interstate shipment, only after the consummation of the shipment, but
before the sale of the merchandise; that is, that the one receiving merchandise of the character
named should, while retaining the full right to use the same, no longer enjoy the right to sell free
from the restrictions as to sale created by state legislation . . . .”).
In other words, the court held that the interstate-commerce clause—that is, the power of
Congress to regulate interstate commerce—attached to that commodity not only before it
entered the State but after it entered the State . . . until the commodity or intoxicating liquor
was in fact delivered to the cosignee.
76 CONG. REC. 4140 (1933) (statement of Sen. Blaine).
132. See Rhodes, 170 U.S. at 423–24.
133. Webb-Kenyon Act, 49 Stat. 877, 27 U.S.C. § 122 (1935) (originally enacted as Act of
Mar. 1, 1913, ch. 90, § 1, 37 Stat. 699).
134. 49 CONG. REC. 707 (1912) (statement of Sen. Kenyon).
135. The Webb-Kenyon Act did not repeal the Wilson Act, which expressly proscribed
discrimination. If Congress, through the Webb-Kenyon Act, wanted to authorize States to
discriminate against out-of-state goods, then it would have repealed the Wilson Act.
136. 76 CONG. REC. 4140 (1933) (statement of Sen. Wagner) (emphasis added).
Mr. WAGNER: I do not want to enter into a controversy, because it really is not very
important, but I do not think the Senator meant to say that by this act Congress delegated
to the States the power to regulate interstate commerce; Congress itself regulated interstate
commerce to the point of removing all immunities of liquor in interstate commerce.
Mr. BLAINE: I thank the Senator. I think he has given the correct statement of the doctrine.
76 CONG. REC. 4140 (1933) (statement of Sen. Wagner) (statement of Sen. Blaine).
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would not provide sufficient protection. 137 There was nothing to prevent the
Supreme Court from narrowly interpreting this Act to make the States’ power
meaningless. Senator John J. Blaine represented the Joint Resolution Committee
when proposing the Twenty-first Amendment to Congress. 138 He recognized
that the Webb-Kenyon Act was sustained by a divided court and wanted “to
assure the so-called dry States against the importation of intoxicating liquor into
those States.” 139 To provide this assurance, Congress intended to write the
Webb-Kenyon Act into the Constitution. 140 Its vehicle was Section 2 of the
Twenty-first Amendment.
When our Government was organized and the Constitution of the United States
adopted, the States surrendered control over and regulation of interstate
commerce. [Section 2] is restoring to the States, in effect, the right to regulate
commerce respecting a single commodity–namely, intoxicating liquor. In other
words, the State is not surrendering any power that it possesses, but rather, by
reason of this provision, in effect acquires powers that it has not at this time. 141

Thus, Congress only intended to give States the power “to regulate commerce
respecting a single commodity.” 142 Section 2 “restored to the States the power
they had under the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts,” 143 namely the power to
prevent the importation of alcohol, not citizens of other states. Notably, because
the Acts did not authorize discrimination, the power to prevent imports was only
effective if the State also banned the manufacture and sale of alcohol within its
borders.

137. The constitutionality of the Act was in doubt. In fact, President Taft vetoed it because he
believed it was an unlawful delegation of Congress’ Commerce Clause powers. Davis, supra note
128, at 12. However, Congress overrode the veto. Id. The Act survived a constitutional challenge
in Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Railway Co. 242 U.S. 311, 330, 332 (1917). But it was
only a 2-2 vote. Id. at 332.
138. See 76 CONG. REC. 4141 (1933) (statement of Sen. Blaine) (“Now, Mr. President, I think
I have set forth . . . the view of the committee as expressed in this joint resolution.”); see also S.J.
Res. 211, 72nd Cong. (1932).
139. 76 CONG. REC. 4141 (1933) (statement of Sen. Blaine).
140. Id.
The committee felt that since the Congress had acted and had definitely legislated upon this
question, while that legislation had been sustained by the Supreme Court, yet it was
sustained by a divided court, and that we could well afford to guarantee to the so-call dry
States the protection designed by section 2.
Id.; see also Davis, supra note 128, at 4, 12 (confirming that the Twenty-first Amendment was
intended to constitutionalize the Webb-Kenyon Act).
141. 76 CONG. REC. 4141 (1933) (statement of Sen. Blaine) (emphasis added).
142. Id.
143. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 484 (2005).
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Textual Analysis

Congress’ intent to constitutionalize the Webb-Kenyon Act is further
evidenced by the language of Section 2, which resembles that of the WebbKenyon Act. The Webb-Kenyon Act regulated the “shipment or transportation”
of alcohol “to be received, possessed, sold, or in any manner used . . . in violation
of any law of such State.” 144 Section 2 regulates the “transportation or
importation into any State . . . for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors,
in violation of the laws thereof.” 145 This resemblance is evidence of “the
framers’ clear intention of constitutionalizing the Commerce Clause framework
established under those statutes.” 146
The language “shipment or transportation” and “transportation or
importation” indicates that Congress wanted to give States the power to prevent
alcohol products from entering their borders. This intention is further shown by
Congress’ desire to protect “dry” States. 147 However, once a State opens its
alcohol market, it may not open it only to in-state interests. 148
If anything, Section 2 reaches more narrowly than the Webb-Kenyon Act.
The Webb-Kenyon Act refers to alcohol that is “to be received, possessed, sold,
or in any manner used.” 149 Section 2 only refers to “delivery or use.” 150 And the
Webb-Kenyon Act was not even a grant of interstate commerce power to the
States. 151 It only removed the interstate immunity from alcohol. 152 If Congress
only intended to remove the interstate character from alcohol, and nothing else,
then it does not follow that Congress intended to give States power to impose
durational-residency requirements on alcohol wholesalers and retailers.

144. Webb-Kenyon Act, 49 Stat. 877, 27 U.S.C. § 122 (1935) (originally enacted as Act of
Mar. 1, 1913, ch. 90, § 1, 37 Stat. 699).
145. U.S. CONST. amend XXI, § 2.
146. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 484 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 206 (1976)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
147. See 76 CONG. REC. 4170 (1933) (statement of Sen. Borah) (“[A]s I understand, this is the
question of striking out section 2, which provides for the protection of the so-called dry States.”);
76 CONG. REC. 4171 (1933) (statement of Sen. Wagner) (“[I]f the dry States want additional
assurance that they will be protected I shall have no objection.”); 76 CONG. REC. 4518 (1933)
(statement of Rep. Robinson) (“Section 2 attempts to protect dry States.”); 76 CONG. REC. 4519
(1933) (statement of Rep. Garber) (“Section 2 prohibits the transportation or importation of
intoxicating liquors for delivery or use into any of the several States where the laws of the State
prohibit such. This section, it is claimed, will protect dry States.”); 76. CONG. REC. 4526 (1933)
(statement of Rep. Tierney) (“[Section 2] will aid and protect the so-called dry States in permitting
them to exclude, if their citizens so wish, all liquor traffic in their domains.”).
148. Peoples Super Liquor Stores, Inc. v. Jenkins, 432 F. Supp. 2d 200, 221 (D. Mass. 2006)
(“Granholm cannot be held to sanction protectionist policies at any of the tiers.”).
149. 27 U.S.C. § 122.
150. U.S. CONST. amend XXI, § 2.
151. See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 481–82.
152. Id. at 482.
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The Indirect Effect of Regulating Products

Naturally, the Twenty-first Amendment gives the States power to indirectly
regulate citizens by subjecting their products to state laws. In Granholm, if New
York and Michigan required all alcohol to pass through the three-tier system,
then the statutes would indirectly regulate producers by requiring their products
to pass through the three-tier system. The Twenty-first Amendment authorizes
this. 153
Unlike the producer tier, the wholesaler and retailer tiers do not produce
alcohol. However, they are responsible for the “transportation or importation”
of alcohol into a state for the “delivery or use therein.” 154 If a State requires all
retail sales of alcohol to be over-the-counter, for example, then the indirect effect
is that the retailer needs a physical location in the state. That is why the “physical
locations of businesses” is an inherent aspect of the three-tier system. 155 It is an
extension of the States’ power to regulate products. Thus, “[w]hen analyzing
whether a State’s alcoholic beverage regulation discriminates under the dormant
Commerce Clause, a beginning premise is that wholesalers may be required to
be within the State.” 156 Imposing durational-residency requirements, however,
is not a natural extension of the States’ power to directly regulate alcohol
products.
2.

The Eighth Circuit Misapplied the Reasoning in Granholm in Two
Key Ways

Even if it is conceded that the Twenty-first Amendment gave the States
power to directly regulate citizens, the Eighth Circuit took Granholm one step
too far when it gave Missouri’s durational-residency requirement a “protected”
status. 157 The statute achieved this “protected” status because it met the Eighth
Circuit’s two-pronged test.
a.

The Statute Did Not Discriminate Against Out-of-State Alcohol
Products

Missouri’s statute directly regulated the officers and directors of alcohol
wholesaler companies. Yet, the Eighth Circuit gave the statute a “protected”
status because it gave equal treatment to out-of-state products and producers. 158
A statute that only targets the officers and directors of a wholesale company and

153. For a discussion on the impact the three-tier system has on out-of-state producers, see
supra note 56 and accompanying text.
154. U.S. CONST. amend XXI, § 2.
155. See Wine Country Gift Baskets.com v. Steen, 612 F.3d 809, 821 (5th Cir. 2010).
156. Id. at 820.
157. S. Wine & Spirits of Am., Inc. v. Div. of Alcohol & Tobacco Control, 731 F.3d 799, 809,
810 (8th Cir. 2013).
158. Id.
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does not even mention products and producers, is not going to discriminate
against out-of-state products and producers. The Eighth Circuit took a protection
that Granholm established for the producer tier, 159 and then applied it to the
wholesaler tier without providing a rationale. This jump cannot be made because
the statutes in Granholm regulated producers, who produce the product. 160
Hence, the holding: “State policies are protected under the Twenty-first
Amendment when they treat liquor produced out of state the same as its
domestic equivalent.” 161 The Missouri statute in Southern Wine regulated
citizens. So the holding, “state policies are protected . . . when they treat liquor
produced out of state the same as its domestic equivalent,” 162 does not logically
follow.
The Fifth Circuit recognized the Eighth Circuit’s error when it held that
“state regulations of the retailer and wholesaler tiers are not immune from
Commerce Clause scrutiny just because they do not discriminate against out-ofstate liquor.” 163 The Eighth Circuit even interpreted Granholm as drawing “a
bright line between the producer tier and the rest of the system.” 164 But it still
took a protection for the producer tier and applied it to the wholesaler tier.
Further, Granholm never examined state alcohol regulations at the wholesaler
or retailer tiers. Thus, if it wished to establish this precedent, it would have stated
that this protection applies to the wholesaler and retailer tier.
b.

The Statute Hid Behind Missouri’s Distribution System

The Eighth Circuit recognized that the nondiscrimination principle applies
to products and producers, but it did not apply the nondiscrimination principle
to wholesalers. It should have examined whether the statute discriminated
against out-of-state wholesalers. The Eighth Circuit likely chose not to apply an
important Commerce Clause principle because of the citation right after the
Supreme Court declared that the three-tier system is “unquestionably
legitimate.” 165 It cited to one of its previous cases, North Dakota v. United
States, and included a quote from Justice Scalia’s concurrence: “The Twenty-

159. Id. Granholm held that “[s]tate policies are protected under the Twenty-first Amendment
when they treat liquor produced out of state the same as its domestic equivalent.” Granholm v.
Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 489 (2005).
160. Id. at 469. The statutes at issue in Granholm required out-of-state wine to pass through the
state’s three-tier system before reaching consumers. Id. at 468. The effect of this was that out-ofstate wineries could only sell their products directly to consumers if they became an in-state winery.
Id. at 469.
161. Id. at 489.
162. See id.
163. Cooper v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 820 F.3d 730, 43 (5th Cir. 2016).
164. S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 810.
165. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489 (quoting North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432
(1982) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
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first Amendment . . . empowers North Dakota to require that all liquor sold for
use in the State be purchased from a licensed in-state wholesaler.” 166 Based on
this, the Eighth Circuit asserted: “If it is beyond question that States may require
wholesalers to be ‘in-state’ without running afoul of the Commerce Clause, then
we think States have flexibility to define the requisite degree of ‘in-state’
presence . . . .” 167 However, North Dakota v. United States was a plurality
opinion. 168 And the quote cited by the Supreme Court was from a concurring
opinion in which no other Justice joined. This is too weak of a foundation on
which to rest such a strong assertion as the Eighth Circuit advanced.
Further, the Eighth Circuit believes that there are no “inherent” or “integral”
parts of the three-tier system, and any regulation defining the structure of the
system is saved. 169 But there has to be some limitation on these regulations. The
States have some room to burden out-of-state interests. 170 But it is not an
unlimited power. For cautionary purposes, the Eighth Circuit held that an instate wholesaler is an “inherent” part of the three-tier system. 171 However, the
Eighth Circuit never argued that an in-state wholesaler who has been a resident
for at least three years is an “inherent” aspect.
The Eighth Circuit took a protection that Granholm created for the producer
tier and then applied it to the wholesaler tier. It then decided not to apply the
nondiscrimination principle. The Eighth Circuit should not be able to pick and
choose.
B.

Subjecting Missouri’s Statute to Strict Scrutiny

As argued in Section III.A, the Twenty-first Amendment should not save
Missouri’s durational-residency requirement. Thus, because the statute, at a
minimum, discriminates in its effect, the next step is to determine whether the
statute advances “a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by
reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.” 172 Like New York and Michigan in
Granholm, the burden is on Missouri to make the “clearest showing” that the
discrimination is necessary by offering “concrete evidence.” 173 Missouri would
argue that:
[A] wholesaler governed . . . by Missouri residents is more apt to be socially
responsible and to promote temperance, because the officers, directors, and
owners are residents of the community and thus subject to negative
166. Id. (quoting North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1982) (Scalia, J.,
concurring)).
167. S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 810.
168. See North Dakota, 495 U.S. 423.
169. See S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 810.
170. See discussion of Wine Country, supra Section II.D.1.
171. S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 810.
172. New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988)
173. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 490 (2005).
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externalities—drunk driving, domestic abuse, underage drinking—that liquor
distribution may produce. Missouri residents . . . are more likely to respond to
concerns of the community, as expressed by their friends and neighbors whom
they encounter day-to-day . . . . [I]n-state residency facilitates law enforcement
against wholesalers, because it is easier to pursue in-state owners, directors, and
officers than to enforce against their out-of-state counterparts. 174

However, the deputy state supervisor for the Division, who testified on
behalf of the Division, said that “wholesalers have little impact upon the direct
sale of alcohol to minors, and that he could not think of any relationship between
the residency requirement and the safety of Missouri citizens.” 175 But even if
Missouri can provide “concrete evidence” that the durational-residency
requirement actually serves the above purposes, it still would not survive strict
scrutiny. Granholm held that “rationales, such as facilitating orderly market
conditions, protecting public health and safety, and ensuring regulatory
accountability” can be achieved though non-discriminatory alternatives. 176
Being subject to the negative externalities that liquor distribution may produce
is not necessary for someone to be socially responsible. There are less
discriminatory ways to require wholesalers to be socially responsible.
Additionally, in this modern era, “conducting an interstate investigation would
seem just as easy as conducting an intrastate one,” 177 and “improvements in
technology have eased the burden of monitoring out-of-state [citizens].” 178
Thus, the legitimate local purposes proposed by Missouri can be achieved
through less discriminatory alternatives.
C. Privileges and Immunities Clause
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides an alternative basis for challenging durational-residency requirements.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . . 179

One privilege and immunity for U.S. citizens is the right to travel. The Supreme
Court has defined this as “the right of the newly arrived citizen to the same
privileges and immunities enjoyed by other citizens of the same State.” 180 In
174. S. Wine, 731 F.3d at 811.
175. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
176. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 492.
177. Glazer’s Wholesale Drug Co., Inc., v. Kansas, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1243 (D. Kan. 2001).
178. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 492.
179. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
180. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502 (1999) (“Permissible justifications for discrimination
between residents and nonresidents are simply inapplicable to a nonresident’s exercise of the right
to move into another State and become a resident of that State.”).
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other words, the citizen of State A, who elects to become a permanent resident
of State B, has the right to be treated like other citizens of State B. The citizen
of State A should not have to wait three years to be treated like other citizens of
State B. “Neither mere rationality nor some intermediate standard of review
should be used to judge the constitutionality of a state rule that discriminates
against some of its citizens because they have been domiciled in the State for
less than a year.” 181 Thus, the Privileges and Immunities Clause is an alternative
path that alcohol beverage wholesalers and retailers can use to subject
durational-residency requirements to strict scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
Justice Stevens’ dissent in Granholm recognized that today, alcohol is
viewed as “an ordinary article of commerce, subject to substantially the same
market and legal controls as other consumer products.” 182 But back when the
Twenty-first was passed, alcohol was known as “demon rum” and millions of
Americans condemned its use. 183 The circumstances that justified the passage of
the Twenty-first Amendment are not as evident today. There is no longer a
legitimate state interest in the alcohol market. Even if there was, durationalresidency requirements do not advance it. This Comment does not propose that
the Twenty-first Amendment serves no purpose in our day and age. Further, it
does not propose a rewriting of the Amendment to expressly narrow the States’
power. Rather, this Comment urges courts to follow the holding of the Fifth
Circuit when analyzing the constitutionality of durational-residency
requirements for alcohol wholesalers and retailers. From Young’s Market Co. 184
to Granholm, the States’ reach under the Twenty-first Amendment has been
narrowed. It is time for future courts to finish the job and subject durationalresidency requirements to Commerce Clause scrutiny.
KEEGAN J. SHEA *

181. Id. at 504.
182. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 494 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 496.
184. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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